The freight rate paradox: three scenarios for 2026

A 40-foot container loaded in Shanghai bound for Genoa cost $1,400 in November 2023. Three months later it cost $4,500. In summer 2024 it hit $6,200. Today, February 2026, it hovers around $3,850.

Those managing international supply chains might think the storm has passed, that rates are returning to normal, that it's time to relax. It isn't.

The maritime transport market is undergoing a structural transformation unprecedented in speed and complexity. For Italian companies importing from China—a trade flow worth over $50 billion annually—understanding what's really happening isn't academic.

It's the difference between being subject to the market and controlling it.

Three tectonic forces are converging simultaneously: the most severe geopolitical crisis of maritime routes since 1956, a wave of new vessels flooding the market with capacity, and an energy cycle compressing carrier operating costs. The result is a market where short-term prices can still surge 30% in a week, but where the underlying trend points unmistakably downward.

On November 19, 2023, Houthi militants seized the Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea. From that moment, everything changed. In less than two months, 90% of container traffic through the Suez Canal evaporated. Major shipping lines—MSC, Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO—diverted their fleets around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 3,500 nautical miles and 10-14 days to each voyage.

Two years later, in February 2026, it's been over 130 days since the last attack (the vessel Minervagracht, hit on September 29, 2025). The Houthis declared an operations suspension on November 11, 2025. War-risk insurance premiums dropped to 0.2% of hull value, the lowest since the crisis began.

Yet: container transits via Suez remain at −86% compared to Q4 2023. Peace is declared, but the ships don't return.

The data capturing the system's inertia is merciless: in early 2026, overall traffic through the Suez Canal remains at −60% versus pre-crisis levels. For containers, the decline is even steeper at 86%. The discrepancy between security conditions—markedly improved—and carrier behavior reveals how deep the operational trauma runs.

CMA CGM, the most aggressive carrier in testing return, announced reopening three Suez routes in January 2026, only to reverse course days later, citing a "complex and uncertain international context." Maersk conducted unannounced test transits in December but hasn't committed stable routes. The Houthi suspension remains conditional: new Chief of Staff Yousef Hassan Al Madani explicitly stated attacks will resume "if Israel restarts Gaza operations."

While the world watched the Red Sea, another force accumulated silently. During the post-pandemic boom of 2021-2022, shipping companies ordered vessels at record pace. Those ships are now entering service, one after another, in a market that no longer needs all that capacity.

The global container fleet has grown 19% since Q3 2023. The order-to-fleet ratio reached 31.6%, one of the highest levels in maritime transport history.

New deliveries tell an unequivocal story: in 2025 they hit 2.1 million TEU, an absolute record. In 2026 they'll slow to 1.7 million, but then explode again: 2.8 million in 2027 (+65%) and 3.5 million in 2028 (+25%), the predicted historic peak.

Here's the paradox: the Cape of Good Hope deviation, extending each voyage by two weeks, effectively absorbed roughly 9% of global capacity. Without the Red Sea crisis, the market would already be in severe overcapacity. The geopolitical crisis inadvertently saved carrier balance sheets.

BIMCO estimates that complete Suez transit normalization would reduce container ship demand by approximately 10%. Combined with ongoing deliveries, this is a recipe for a carrier price war that could last years.

The third structural factor is energy cost. Brent crude trades below $69/barrel, down nearly 10% year-over-year. European natural gas (TTF) collapsed 42% in a year. For carriers, bunker fuel represents 30-50% of operating costs.

Oil at $69 instead of $85 means savings of roughly $3,000-5,000 per Asia-Europe voyage on an average container ship. This has two implications. First: carriers have room to further lower rates without going into losses, at least on main routes. Second: the breakeven point has dropped, meaning rates can fall lower before hitting the floor.

On Asia–West Coast USA routes, spot rates are already below breakeven at $1,460/FEU. Mediterranean routes still have margin, but the direction is clear.

Italy imported $51.5 billion worth of goods from China in 2023, down 15.5% from the historic peak of $60.9 billion in 2022. That peak was inflated by the energy crisis and supply chain disruptions: higher unit prices, not necessarily higher volumes.

Assuming freight incidence of 3-8% of FOB value, the 33% container rate reduction implies aggregate savings of €500 million to €1.3 billion for the Italian system. For a company with €10 million in China imports, direct savings are in the range of €100-250k annually versus 2024 peaks. This isn't trivial: for many companies, it represents one to two EBITDA margin points.

There's also a hidden advantage. The divergence between the container world (−33% YoY on SCFI index) and the bulk world (+134% on Baltic Dry Index) is crucial for Italian companies. Finished and semi-finished goods imported from China—electronics, mechanical components, textiles, consumer goods—travel in containers. Italian manufacturing companies therefore benefit from a double advantage: falling container rates and lower industrial commodity prices (steel −6.6%, iron ore −5.9%).

Scenario A: Gradual Suez Return (estimated probability: 45%). Carriers progressively return to the Red Sea in H2 2026, after Lunar New Year and verification of ceasefire stability. The transition lasts 3-6 months. Rates gradually decline 20-30% from current levels. European ports—Genoa, La Spezia, Gioia Tauro, but also Rotterdam and Hamburg—manage the transition with moderate congestion. This is the most favorable scenario: plannable, with time to adapt.

Scenario B: Extended Stalemate (estimated probability: 35%). The geopolitical situation remains uncertain. Carriers continue using Cape of Good Hope as the main route, with occasional Suez transits. Rates remain in the $2,500-4,000/FEU range for Mediterranean, with high volatility. Overcapacity is partially masked by longer routes. Companies must live with 35-45 day lead times and delivery time uncertainty.

Scenario C: Recurring Shock (estimated probability: 20%). New Red Sea escalation or other geopolitical shock (Taiwan, Strait of Hormuz). Rates return to violent spikes, potentially above $5,000/FEU. Carriers impose emergency surcharges. Companies without sufficient inventory suffer supply disruptions. This is the scenario justifying strategic buffer maintenance even when the market appears favorable.

1. ​​​​​​​Indexed contracts, never fixed-price: in a market with structural downward trend, locking in an annual fixed-price contract equals buying at the peak. The correct response is negotiating contracts indexed to SCFI or Freightos Baltic Index, with quarterly revision clauses.
2. Inventory accumulation window: the combination of falling container rates (−33% YoY), weak industrial commodities (steel −6.6%, iron −5.9%), and relatively stable euro creates a favorable window for strategic inventory build-up. Total procurement cost (CIF) is at the lowest levels of the past three years.
3. Prepare Plan B for Suez transition: when full return occurs, European ports will experience 2-3 weeks of simultaneous arrivals. Estimates speak of arrival increases between 10% and 39%.
4. Air freight as tactical weapon: China–Europe air rates dropped to roughly $3.86/kg, well below last year's $5.00/kg (−23% YoY). For high-value, low-volume components, air transport is again a competitive option.
5. Continuous monitoring: key indices to follow weekly are SCFI (Shanghai Containerized Freight Index), Freightos Baltic Index by route (FBX13 for Asia–Mediterranean), and Baltic Dry Index for bulk.

The maritime freight market is experiencing a convergence of forces that rarely occurs. Geopolitical crisis, structural excess capacity, and compressed energy costs are creating an environment that, in the medium term, will be unequivocally favorable for importers. But the transition will be anything but linear.

Italian companies that can read the market methodically—indexed contracts instead of fixed, strategic inventory in weak moments, contingency plans for shocks—won't just save on transport costs. They'll gain competitive advantage over competitors who continue navigating by sight.

​​​​​​​In maritime transport, as in business strategy, advantage doesn't go to who has more data. It goes to who transforms it into faster decisions.