Winter Olympics: the economic return no one has told you about

25 years of data across eight editions of the Games reveal that the real returns from the Winter Olympics exist, but not where we look for them. And they hide a crucial lesson for Italian firms.

Every time a country bids for the Winter Olympics, the organizing committee publishes a number: the expected economic impact. Billions of euros, thousands of jobs, GDP growth. Every time, that number turns out to be wrong.

With Milano-Cortina 2026 currently underway as we write, the Vedrai Observatory has completed an analysis of 25 years of Olympic data that reveals something unexpected: the economic returns from the Winter Olympics exist, but they don't arrive where we expect them.

Not in GDP growth (which turns out to be zero). Not in increased consumer demand inspired by medals (which doesn't exist). Not in cost predictability (every edition has exceeded the budget by 172% on average).

The real return hides in a specific channel, asymmetric, and reserved for those who had already built something before the opening ceremony began: brand amplification for countries that are already producers. And in this channel lies a lesson that extends far beyond sports. A lesson every Italian company should understand.

Italy exports more sports equipment than it imports. The surplus has been uninterrupted since 2000: $293 million in 2024. After Turin 2006, Italian sports equipment exports grew 46% in four years.

Montebelluna, in the province of Treviso, produces over 75% of the world's premium ski boots within a 20-kilometer radius.

Italy doesn't import Olympics. It exports the brand that the Olympics amplify.

Our analysis compared three radically different approaches:

• China invested approximately $96 billion over seven years to bring 300 million Chinese onto the slopes. It built 803 resorts, created an entire training pipeline. Sports result: from 1 to 9 golds at Beijing 2022. Market result: only 30% of new skiers continued skiing after the Games.
• Italy hosted Turin 2006. Medals collapsed by 62% in the following four years. But sports equipment exports grew 46%. Margins consolidated in the premium segment.
• Austria hasn't hosted recent Olympics. Yet, for every dollar of skis China exports relative to the size of its economy, Austria exports 450.

This isn't a gap that can be closed with industrial policy. It's the result of sixty years of craftsmen, engineers, and athletes working side by side in the same valleys. These things don't transfer: they're inherited.

Olympic hosting doesn't create an industry from nothing. But for those who already produce, it functions as an amplifier: two weeks of global visibility that reinforce positioning built over decades.

The effect is asymmetric—it grows exports more than imports—and concentrates in the premium segment, where Made in Italy has a structural advantage that no competitor can replicate quickly.

This mechanism doesn't only apply to the Olympics. And it reveals an uncomfortable truth: investing to create from scratch rarely works. Investing to amplify what already exists always works.

As Milano-Cortina 2026 unfolds, Italian companies face the same strategic question:
Do we chase new opportunities or amplify the value we've already built?
Our Olympic research reveals three systemic errors that repeat identically in the business world:

• Error 1: Confusing Visibility with Value Creation. China's $96 billion created global visibility, Olympic medals, imposing infrastructure. It didn't create a lasting market. Many companies dedicate disproportionate energy to exploring new markets, new customers, new products. Meanwhile, the existing portfolio is managed by inertia. High-volume but low-margin products absorb production capacity. The mix slowly deteriorates without anyone noticing.
• Error 2: Not Distinguishing Merit from Context. Our analysis shows that across 30 examined cases, the relationship between medals and growth in equipment imports is indistinguishable from chance. The Netherlands won 23 medals in skating at Sochi 2014—the most dominant result in history—and skate imports fell 30%. Medals don't inspire purchases. Performance that seems like success may depend entirely on favorable context, seasonality, temporary competitor problems. Without distinguishing decision from context, wrong choices get reinforced.
• Error 3: Treating Every Decision as Isolated. The Olympics are a system of interconnected decisions. Countries that treat them as separate decisions obtain fragmented results.

Decisions about sales, production, purchasing, and pricing are strongly interconnected, but they're made at different times, by different functions, without systemic vision. The result: local optimization that destroys global value.

Montebelluna produces 75% of the world's premium ski boots within a 20-kilometer radius. It's not the result of a brilliant strategic plan. It's the result of sixty years of craftsmen, engineers, and athletes working side by side.

This is an advantage that isn't built with an investment, isn't copied with technology, isn't transferred with industrial policy. It's inherited. But even inherited advantages can be wasted.

Olympic hosting didn't create Montebelluna's ski boot industry. But it amplified what already existed, making visible to the world an advantage built over decades.

The question for companies isn't "what new opportunities should we pursue?" but "what value have we already built that we can amplify?"

• What is our equivalent of Montebelluna?
• Where do we have an advantage that competitors cannot replicate quickly?
• Which part of our portfolio generates more value than we think?
• Which decisions are eroding this value without us noticing?

These questions require a different view. No longer fragmented by function, no longer driven by urgency, no longer based on intuition. A view that connects decisions, portfolio, and context in a single system.